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Abstract 
This thesis studies the effect of foreign investment policy in the Gulf Cooperation 
Council member nations on labor migration to the Persian Gulf. The study uses a difference in 
differences regression to estimate coefficients for financial liberalization, special economic 
zones, and foreign direct investment on total immigrant stocks. The regression analysis finds a 
weakly negative association between special economic zones and immigration, and no 
significant effect of foreign investment. 
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1. Introduction 
The Arab states of the Persian Gulf are among the wealthiest in the world due to 
high concentrations of natural resources, particularly oil and natural gas, and generally 
stable governments. These factors as well as Saudi Arabia’s efforts to expand its 
influence in regional competition with Iran have caused the Persian Gulf to take on a high 
strategic significance to any nation with a vested interest in Middle Eastern politics. 
However, a variety of elements now threaten the extended stability of the Gulf region. 
Because the countries in the Persian Gulf region have very sparse populations 
relative to resource wealth, they have relied on migrant workers to provide the labor 
required to extract their resources. The ever-increasing proportion of migrants in the 
population and international concerns for their rights and well-being often come into 
conflict with the interests of the native workforce, a workforce which faces high 
unemployment and demands higher wages than migrants from South Asia (see section 
2.2). Tension between these groups could threaten each country’s stability from the 
inside. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia’s participation in the Yemeni Civil War alongside the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) and their joint blockade of Qatar, both driven by its rivalry 
with Iran, threaten these countries’ economic stability and international credibility.  
2 
 
This study focuses on the migrant labor aspect of Gulf society. In particular, it 
uses quantitative methods to study the efficacy of financial policy intended to discourage 
immigration to the Gulf. It finds that contrary to macroeconomic theory, investment 
policy intended to grow the active labor force through foreign investment may in fact also 
encourage immigration. 
1.1 Research Question 
Because of high international migrant stocks in the Arab states of the Persian 
Gulf, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members have sought to introduce policies 
that discourage immigration and encourage growth and the employment of native 
workers. Foremost among these policies are broad financial liberalization, and the 
establishment of special economic zones (SEZs) to promote foreign investment in high-
tech and service industries. This study uses difference in differences analysis on the 
relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and migration to find an answer to 
the question: “do SEZs and increased FDI achieve the GCC’s goal of reducing low-
skilled migration?”  
1.2 Outline 
To answer this question, this paper first surveys the theoretical economic 
literature for the interaction between investment and labor migration and identifies a 
predicted substitution effect between FDI and immigration (section 2.1). It then turns to 
ethnographic and demographic studies of the GCC members to provide an overview the 
available data, and the situation of migration to the GCC (section 2.2).  
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In the third section, this paper first identifies the GCC’s perceived need for 
policies to reduce immigration to its member states (section 3.1). Then it looks at the 
specific steps taken in the financial sector to encourage investment and thereby decrease 
immigration. In section 3.2, the paper outlines the history of investment policy reforms in 
the GCC country-by-country in order to demonstrate the trend towards liberalization 
across the region. Then, in section 3.3, it identifies the specific policies related to SEZs in 
the GCC, and finds that they all (Except for Saudi Arabia) include a policy allowing 
foreign investors to own 100% of the stakes in an enterprise conducted within an SEZ. 
These policies and the years of their introduction are used to identify treatment and 
control groups which are in turn used to analyze the efficacy of SEZs in reducing the 
dependence on immigrants. 
In section 4.1, the paper explains the reasons for choosing to study GCC members 
for the effect of SEZs on immigration, and it provides partial justification to the parallel 
trends assumption. Then in section 4.2, it introduces the data used to examine the effect 
of SEZ policies. Finally, in section 4.4, it defines the difference-in-differences statistical 
model used to estimate the impact of the policy and control for FDI. In section 5, the 
paper reports the results of the estimated model and a series of robustness tests. Lastly, 
the paper concludes in section 6 with an overview and implications for future research. 
1.3 Summary of Findings 
The empirical estimates of the regression model generate conflicting results that 
are not always consistent with the hypothesis that SEZs which allow full foreign 
ownership of businesses reduce the non-negative migration trends in the Gulf. The main 
linear model, however, does find a significant reduction in the migration trend following 
4 
 
the introduction of the SEZ policy. Surprisingly, there is no evidence of a substitution 
effect between migration and FDI. This suggests that the policy may take effect through a 
different mechanism than the theoretical literature suggests. 
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2. Literature Review 
Existing quantitative studies of labor migration to the Persian Gulf largely center 
around attempts to construct accurate estimations of the composition of the migrant 
workforce given very little accessible data published by the governments of the GCC 
member states. The theoretical and empirical economic literature thoroughly covers the 
impacts of FDI on wages, employment, and migration. However, there is a gap in the 
literature regarding empirical analysis of FDI’s influence on migrant workers to the GCC 
states. This gap exists despite the fact that encouraging investment and labor force 
nationalization are major priorities for the council’s members. 
2.1 Economic Literature 
Trade theory has long examined the relationship between labor and capital, and in 
particular has sought to identify the conditions that lead to either a substitution effect or 
complementary effect between capital and labor. Most often, economists use standard 
models for bilateral trade in goods and bilateral trade’s impact on wages and capital rents. 
Although these models can be used to explore and explain empirical relationships 
between immigration and FDI, and thus offer useful insight to the situation of the GCC. 
However, they do not always precisely model the trade-offs the GCC faces, since its 
members are not typically engaged investment relationships with the same countries from 
which they receive immigrants. Bilateral theoretical models compare changes in wages 
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and rents between two economies to describe the effects engaged in international trade. 
The case of the GCC is more multi-lateral than bilateral. 
The Heckscher-Ohlin two-factor model (in this case, the factors being labor and 
capital) provides the standard framework for explaining the effects of capital inflows on 
the workforce. The model considers two countries, one abundant in labor, and the other 
abundant in capital, and concludes via the principle of comparative advantage the 
countries will specialize in industries intensive in their abundant factor. More relevant to 
the topic of of this paper, under the Stolper-Samuelson (1941) hypothesis derived from 
this model, capital and labor are considered substitutes, such that a rise in relative rental 
rates (encouraging investment) would see a corresponding decrease in relative wages 
(discouraging immigration). Whether or not this substitution effect occurs in the Gulf 
economies is the core empirical question under consideration in this study. 
The Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) (HMY) model considers the firm-level 
decision between international investment and trade and finds that inward FDI decreases 
in relative importance to trade when labor stocks increase. The model establishes an 
initial case of firms in many countries, each with their own endowments of labor and 
wages, producing differentiated products in a particular sector h. Then it gives a firm the 
opportunity to enter the market subject to country-specific fixed entry costs. After 
entering, a firm may choose to produce or exit, with production incurring an additional 
fixed labor cost. Should the firm choose to export it would face additional fixed entry 
costs per new market. However, if a firm chooses not to export, then it may still access a 
foreign market through affiliate production (i.e. FDI), which incurs high fixed production 
costs because of the duplication of industrial facilities, but reduces the marginal costs of 
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shipping. The activities of exporting or affiliate production are considered mutually 
exclusive in any given foreign market. Under this model, labor is the primary driver of 
marginal costs, so a firm’s profits increase in direct proportion to productivity of labor. 
Although the HMY paper does not address immigration directly, it implies a substitution 
effect in labor- intensive industries, since immigration will increase the productivity of 
firms with respect to labor and decrease wages in any given economy. 
With respect to models featuring immigration, Hubert Jayet and Lea Marchal 
(2016) extended the H-O model to a three-factor model. One of their primary objectives 
was to reconcile discrepancies between empirical evidence and the standard two-factor 
model by introducing the distinction between skilled and unskilled labor, and by 
analyzing extreme cases of high and low investment. They describe a model featuring a 
developed economy called “North” and a developing economy called “South,” and a 
global market including a capital-intensive and a non-capital intensive good. Initially, the 
Northern capitalists hold the world’s capital stock, and will choose to invest in the South 
as long as they can expect higher returns from offshore production in South. 
Alternatively, the Northern capitalists can offer higher relative wages that will induce 
unskilled Southern labor to migrate. The model’s equilibria are determined by the costs 
of migration and the mobility of capital. Under the given initial conditions, Jayet and 
Marchal find “...that capital and unskilled labor flows are substitutes, and that capital and 
skilled labor flows are complements (55).” According to this finding, the GGC members 
should expect a decrease in unskilled immigration as foreign investment boosts their 
capital stocks, although they might also experience an increase in skilled labor 
immigration. 
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Akinori Tomohara (2017) designed a statistical model based on the HMY 
assumptions but introduced the distinction between skilled and unskilled labor. The 
empirical estimate of the model implies that FDI decreases in labor-intensive industries 
as unskilled labor migration increases, as the HMY model would predict. On the other 
hand, the estimate also implies that FDI increases to capital intensive industries with the 
arrival of more skilled migrants. However, since unskilled migrants constitute 88% of the 
migrant stock in Japan, the substitution effect dominates overall. These findings are 
directly in line with those of the Jayet-Marshal model. Additionally, they offer an 
identical implication for the Persian Gulf, namely that FDI can reduce dependency on its 
large unskilled migrant populations, and provide employment opportunities in high-
skilled industries for its underemployed workforces. 
Despite the above models’ macroeconomic and micro-foundational support for 
the substitutability of capital and unskilled labor, the models do not capture a long run 
dynamic relationship that may be occurring. Since increased stocks of workers should 
increase capital’s productivity relative to labor, and decrease wages, the models imply a 
complementary relationship between labor and investment. Firms will be incentivized to 
invest in the GCC as the fixed costs of FDI decline and a large, relatively inexpensive 
workforce offers high returns on investment. Over the long run, as capital stocks increase, 
labor productivity should recover to some extent, and eventually wages may reach a high 
enough level to encourage new immigration. A study of migration to the United States by 
Maurice Kugler and Hillel Rapoport (2007) found contemporaneous substitutability 
between FDI and migration in accordance with the H-O model, but a difference-in-
differences regression featuring lagged FDI found a dynamic complementarity over the 
9 
 
long run. The authors explain the complementarity effect as the result of networks 
between migrants and their home countries and between migrants and their host countries 
that facilitate FDI, rather than explaining the effect through changes in wages. 
Unfortunately, the all of these models are designed to account for effects of FDI 
and migration between the FDI-sending and FDI-receiving countries, so they may not 
entirely suffice to explain a substitution effect between FDI and migration when the FDI-
sending country is not the same as the one from which migrants are moving, as is the case 
with the GCC. For example, the network effects cited by Kugler and Rapoport could not 
explain an increase in United States FDI to Qatar when most migrants to Qatar arrive 
from South Asia. Neither does the HMY model’s firm-level decisions to invest or trade 
directly correspond to the topic of this paper, even though it offers valuable insights to 
the relationship between labor and FDI. In order appropriately cover the effects of FDI on 
immigration to the GCC specifically, this paper will now turn to the literature treating the 
Gulf’s particular situation. 
2.2 Migrant Workers in the Persian Gulf 
Since 1985, no GCC state has had a labor force ratio of foreign to national 
workers lower than 50%, e.g., in 2008, Qatar’s workforce consisted of 94% foreigners 
(Baldwin-Edwards 2011). Moreover, only Saudi Arabia and Oman’s populations are 
majority national, and the UAE’s foreign born population comprises as much as 80% of 
the total (Valenta and Jakobsen 2016). Throughout the GCC states, workers of South 
Asian origin by and large dominate the labor pool, with other Arab immigrants (largely 
Egyptian) forming a distant second largest block (Shah 2013). In recent decades, the 
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failure to balance an effective immigration system that maintains security and a low cost 
labor supply with sufficient respect for workers’ rights has generated controversy.1  
The studies seeking to explore GCC demographics in-depth face a shortage of 
readily available demographic information from reliable sources such as national 
statistics agencies, thus academic demographers typically rely on the records of labor-
exporting countries to compliment whatever national statistics are available. Some 
insights into the political obstacles to accurate data collection are provided in Onn 
Winckler’s 2017 book Arab Political Demography. The second chapter, “Sources for 
Demographic Research of the Arab States,” gives a country-by-country overview of 
available statistics and offers likely reasons for each state’s obfuscation of their records. 
Although the book is primarily concerned with the religious composition of the Arab 
states, it briefly covers which data are collected nationally, including immigration data. 
For Saudi Arabia, Winckler finds that in the first three censuses (conducted in 
1962, 1974, and 1992) each over-reported the number of citizens and underreported 
foreign workers, most likely to marginalize the Shi’a minority and allow for higher 
OPEC oil production quotas. Throughout this period, the annual Statistical Yearbooks did 
not include a demographics chapter. However, he concludes that the 2004 census most 
likely produced an accurate assessment of the population size, as its finding fell below 
what would be expected from growth rates since the 1992 census. Saudi Arabia no longer 
has incentive to underreport its population size, as a general political liberalization and 
reduced economic pressure following the US invasion of Iraq lowered incentives to 
                                                          
1
 See Human Rights Watch’s 2010 press release “Middle East: End 'Sponsored' Gateway to Human 
Trafficking,” https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/06/14/middle-east-end-sponsored-gateway-human-
trafficking 
11 
 
inflate population numbers. Thus official figures since 2004 are most likely accurate, 
albeit deficient in precise disaggregated data. 
Bahrain is the GCC country with the longest history of carrying out censuses, 
beginning in 1941, and in addition its Civil Registration System has recorded births and 
deaths of Bahraini citizens since 1980. The Bahraini authorities even publish the 
population of migrant workers by nationality, although they do not provide a breakdown 
of the religious composition of those populations. The religious composition data are 
omitted in order to not empower the Shi’a majority against the ruling Sunni family 
(Winckler 2017). 
Winckler characterizes the Kuwait, Oman, and the UAE as “...countries with 
nothing to hide, but even so, totally disregard the religious composition (47).” Kuwait has 
conducted censuses since 1957, and recorded births since 1952, although these data were 
considered unreliable until 1970 when birth registration became universal. Oman was an 
insular society until a 1970 coup encouraged more open records-keeping and the 
publication of development strategies. The first census was still not held until 1993. After 
that, Oman began to publish up-to-date information, including indigenous population and 
foreign workers by nationality. The UAE began to conduct censuses in 1968, but did not 
distinguish between foreign and indigenous population until 1978, and did not publish a 
census differentiating between foreign nationalities until 2005. 
Finally, aside from a total population count, Qatar releases no demographic data 
differentiating between its citizens or migrants. Winckler posits that Qatar intentionally 
obscures the number of its citizens because its foreign population is the highest 
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worldwide, and the Qatari government tries to hide the number of foreigners that it has 
naturalized. 
Martin Baldwin-Edwards (2011) has attempted to construct a number of key 
immigration and employment statistics up to 2009 from a variety of sources, while 
tracking demographic evolution over time. He ties immigration patterns to changes in 
international oil markets over time, and provides a table of the foreign component of 
GCC populations for the years 1975, 1985, 1997, and 2008, showing an overall increase 
over time. Later, drawing on data from the International Labor Organization and the 
World Bank, as well as his own calculations from GCC data, Baldwin-Edwards finds the 
GCC labor market to be extremely segmented between a public sector dominated by 
well-paid nationals, and a private sector employing mostly immigrants with weak laws 
protecting workers. He also uses national datasets to calculate unemployment rates by 
sector for immigrants and nationals wherever the requisite data are available, noting that 
the labor market is unable to absorb young nationals entering the workforce, and thereby 
causing increased unemployment (p. 19). Overall, Baldwin-Edwards’s analysis likely 
provides the most accurate source for a number of key labor statistics in the GCC until 
2009, although his calculations fail to cover enough historical years for a trend analysis. 
Citing Baldwin-Edwards for much of the historical data on the GCC labor force, 
Nasra Shah (2013) has compiled a similar study analyzing trends in migration. She 
further supplements the data by compiling emigration statistics from migrant-sending 
countries, and adding an immigration/emigration policy analysis for sending and 
receiving countries. From a 2009 United Nations policy survey, she finds a discrepancy 
between the preferences of the GCC and the nine largest senders of immigrants to the 
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GCC. Four of the sending countries reported satisfaction with their emigration levels, 
while two found them to be too low, and three stated that their policy objective is to 
increase emigration, while the other half intended to maintain those levels. As for the six 
members of the GCC, four reported that immigration levels were too high and had set 
policy goals to reduce immigration, while the other two were satisfied and intended to 
maintain the then-current levels. In practice these restrictive policies to reduce the 
number of migrant workers involve imposing and enforcing immigration quotas and 
deporting irregular workers. Shah also examines the individual policies of the six main 
labor-sending countries to the GCC and finds that although the strategies for reducing 
barriers to emigration vary country by country, every country considers the remittances 
received from migrants a vital asset to their development.  
Overall, both the Baldwin-Edwards and Shah studies point to labor migration 
becoming an increasingly contentious political issue within the Arab Gulf states and 
internationally, with a conflict of interest between the populations of the Arab states and 
the populations of the migrant sending countries.  
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3. Historical Context 
A number of unique circumstances characterize the Arab Gulf states, and they 
merit some consideration prior to a quantitative study of their policy. Since the GCC’s 
founding in 1981, concerns over oil revenue and migrant labor dependency have driven 
both the international trade and internal development policies of its members. 
3.1 Labor Migration 
Perhaps the most notable distinction between the GCC member states and their 
Arab neighbors, or any other country, is their extreme dependence on foreign workers to 
sustain their labor intensive industries like oil production or construction.  The 
widespread use of foreign labor has led to high unemployment amongst the native 
population, and therefore the GCC is attempting to develop human capital in their 
populations and attract investment in less labor intensive industries so as to provide more 
employment opportunities for their citizens. In addition to concerns about the native 
population’s well-being, the employment policies of the GCC countries also raise 
concerns for the health and safety of their ever-increasing population of migrant workers. 
Since petroleum production is the primary export industry of the GCC, migration 
trends have largely followed the development of the oil industry, and subsequently 
15 
 
changes in oil prices. The Arab Persian Gulf oil industry was born with the discovery of 
oil in Bahrain in 1932, and entered its infancy as reserves were discovered in all six of the 
GCC countries concluding with Oman in 1967 (Winckler 2009). As the industry grew, 
even during these early stages before the 1970’s oil boom, the foreign-born population 
would grow to reach between 800,000-1.4 million. The migrant workforce then doubled 
in size during the oil shocks and boom of the early 1970s and continued to grow at an 
annual average rate of 7.7 percent for the GCC from 1975-1985. Consequently, by 1985, 
migrants constituted 65 percent of the workforce in Saudi Arabia --the largest of the GCC 
countries (Baldwin-Edwards 2011). Since then, although the absolute number of 
immigrants has increased uniformly from year to year, the proportions of migrants to 
native-born workers have fallen everywhere but in Qatar and Bahrain as more native 
workers have entered the labor force. 
The GCC members all allow their companies to sponsor the employment of 
foreign workers under a contract labor system known as kafala. These contracts have 
faced widespread criticism from human rights groups, even to the point of being labeled 
“slave labor” by a variety of Western media outlets.2 Despite some changes to the system 
made in the wake of increased international scrutiny as construction of World Cup 2022 
facilities began in 2016, independent auditors still uncovered a number of abuses when 
they examined ten contractors in 2017. Among those abuses were charging workers 
recruitment fees, having workers work excessive hours without days off, and withholding 
passports (Impactt Limited).  
                                                          
2
 See The Independent, October 3, 2017, “World Cup 2022: Qatar's workers are not workers, they are 
slaves…,” www.independent.co.uk (accessed February 23, 2019). Or the Guardian’s “Slavery in Focus” 
series for representative examples. 
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All of the GCC states have implemented economic nationalization programs 
(generally nicknamed according to the model “Saudization,” for Saudi Arabia, or 
“Emiritization,” for the UAE, etc.) out of concern for the detrimental impacts of their 
foreign labor dependency on the employment rates of the native population. These 
programs are intended to encourage policies the develop the human capital of the 
indigenous workforce by expanding educational opportunities and by imposing 
requirements to hire a minimum fixed percentage of native workers on firms operating 
within the country’s borders. These programs also include development goals for the 
country as a whole, which generally consist of policies to attract investment and 
encourage growth in industries other than natural resource extraction.
3
 This study 
specifically examines the impact of the policies designed to attract FDI on the number of 
migrants in the GCC countries. 
3.2 Foreign Ownership Restrictions 
A cursory glance at the history of GCC investment policy reveals a constant trend 
towards financial liberalization after an initial period of enforcing protectionist measures 
with the aim of encouraging domestic industry.  
Currently, all GCC members impose varying degrees of restrictions on foreign 
ownership of enterprises within their borders, although these restrictions have been 
loosened considerably in recent years. These restrictions are limited to certain industries 
in some countries, and in most countries are now absent in special economic zones. 
Because this paper’s analysis depends upon changes in investment law to define 
                                                          
3
 See Saudi Arabia’s “Vision 2030” goals at vision2030.gov.sa/en or the UAE’s “Sustainable Development 
Goals” at https://www.government.ae/en/about-the-uae/leaving-no-one-behind for representative examples. 
17 
 
treatment and control groups, what follows is a country by country overview of foreign 
ownership policy. This overview includes a distinction between the general commercial 
environment in each of the Gulf states and that of their special economic zones (SEZs).
4
 
Bahrain: The current law dictating the framework of foreign investment in 
Bahrain is Royal Decree no. 21 of 2001, issued by the Amir Hamed Al Khalifa. This law 
repealed the Commercial Companies Law of 1975. Article 65 of the Decree provides the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry with the authority to set limits on foreign capital in 
domestic industries and to block the trade of foreign capital on the Bahraini stock 
exchange. Part XIV of the Decree (articles 345 - 350) outlines the regulations on foreign 
owned enterprises, including the requirements that a Bahraini sponsor them, and that 
copies of all relevant documents be provided in Arabic. However, as of 2016, outside of 
the range of dates studied here, Bahrain opened many sectors to 100% foreign ownership 
(US Department of State 2018). 
Kuwait: In 2013, Kuwait updated its investment law by establishing the Direct 
Investment Promotion Authority. This authority was granted broad powers over 
investment policy in Kuwait under the condition that it conduct studies demonstrating its 
policies’ efficacy in attracting investors (and that such studies be shared with investors). 
The law charges the Authority with setting capital requirements for investment, granting 
licenses to investment projects, and establishing SEZs. Unlike the rest of the GCC, 
Kuwait’s FDI law does not set upper bounds on foreign investment in any sector, and 
explicitly protects foreign assets from seizure. So, under the 2013 law, Kuwait’s country-
                                                          
4
 The investment laws of Bahrain and Kuwait are not available in English translations, and were read in 
Arabic for this study. 
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wide investment policy compares closely to SEZs in the rest of the GCC (Law no. 116 of 
2013 on Encouraging Direct Investment in Kuwait). 
Saudi Arabia: The earliest foreign investment law currently in effect in Saudi 
Arabia is Royal Decree M/1, passed in 2000. It superseded the investment law in place 
since 1978, and granted companies under whole or partial foreign ownership essentially 
the same legal rights as Saudi firms. However, the law does provide for the Supreme 
Economic Council to limit that activities of foreign enterprises at the Council’s 
discretion. A 2004 law left the framework of the 2000 law intact, but allowed for 
foreigners to buy domestic enterprises and stipulated minimum investments by industry. 
The updated law reiterated the right of the General Investment Authority to limit the 
percentage of foreign ownership of companies operating in Saudi Arabia (The Executive 
Rules of the Foreign Investment Act). 
Oman: Royal Decree No. 102 of 1994 officially abrogated the investment law of 
1974, and banned foreign ownership of shares in businesses operating in Oman 
exceeding 49% of total shares in the project. However, the law allowed the Minister of 
Commerce and Industry to raise the limit to 65% upon receiving a recommendation from 
the Foreign Capital Investment Committee. Furthermore, contingent upon receiving a 
recommendation from the Minister of Commerce and Industry, the Development Council 
may remove the limit entirely, provided that the Council determines that the project 
promotes the national interest in development. The law also exempts new foreign 
enterprises from taxation for a period of five years, and leaves open the possibility that 
any restrictions be lifted or imposed by royal decree. 
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United Arab Emirates: Until 2018, the UAE had among the strictest investment 
laws in the GCC, in that it did not allow generally complete foreign ownership, except for 
in SEZs. The 2018 Federal Law by Decree No. 19 Regarding Foreign Direct Investment 
opened most industries to FDI and complete foreign ownership, with the explicit 
intention of promoting investment and diversifying the nation’s industrial base. It also 
established the Foreign Direct Investment Committee which is charged with stimulating 
investment in the Emirates. This committee also enjoys the privilege of defining the 
activities in which complete foreign ownership is or is not permitted. 
Qatar: The investment law of Qatar, promulgated in 2000, represents one of the 
more stringent investment policies in the GCC (Law no. 10 of 2000). In general, a foreign 
entity may not hold more than a 49% stake in any Qatari enterprise unless it both receives 
the permission of the Minister of Finance (who must decide that the project matches the 
Development Plan of the State of Qatar) and fits into one of a specified number of types 
of industries (i.e., agriculture, industry, health, education, tourism, and the development 
and exploitation of natural resources). Investment in the fields of banking and insurance, 
and owning real estate are strictly prohibited under the law. Instead, long term projects 
may only rent land on 50 year leases. 
Overall, since the mid-1990’s, the GCC has loosened restrictions on foreign 
ownership in their domestic economy, with nearly all states allowing complete foreign 
ownership in at least some industries. However, the specifics of the investment laws are 
always left out of the legal framework. For example, they are determined by executive 
committees or royal decree, leaving some degree of arbitrary uncertainty around the 
details of the laws and their long-term enforcement. Despite this trend of liberalizing 
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investment policy, many restrictions on foreign ownership of enterprises operating inside 
national borders remain in place throughout the GCC. These restrictions are usually lifted 
in SEZs. 
3.3 Special Economic Zones 
One of the first steps towards financial market liberalization that all GCC 
countries have taken since 1985 is to establish SEZs in major cities or at ports. This 
analysis is particularly concerned with which countries allow complete foreign ownership 
of enterprises operating within their SEZs, and when they first introduced a policy 
allowing such ownership. Unfortunately, since the specific details of GCC investment 
policies are all set through executive committees rather than through legislative 
processes, the SEZ policies in most Gulf states are not recorded in the legal code (Kuwait 
in an exception in this regard, having passed a law. See below). Therefore, this paper 
relies on government websites and the financial consulting firm websites to construct the 
following country-by-country overview of SEZs in the GCC. 
Bahrain: Bahrain established its first SEZ, the Bahrain Logistics Zone, near the 
Khalifa bin Salman port in 2001. It has since established two others: one at the Bahrain 
International Airport, and the one called the Bahrain International Investment Park. All 
three offer 100% foreign ownership, ten-year corporate tax exemptions, and five year 
exemptions from employment restrictions to investors. In addition, they eliminate import 
duties, which allows duty-free access to the rest of the GCC (Meed Consultants 2013). 
Kuwait: Kuwait established its first free trade zone (the Kuwait Free Trade Zone) 
in 1995 via Decree-Law no. 26 of 1995 Concerning Free Trade Zones. It is the only SEZ 
21 
 
in the GCC established by law and not through a planning committee. This SEZ offers 
100% foreign ownership to investors as well as permanent tax exemptions. 
Saudi Arabia: Saudi Arabia has proposed four SEZs, referred to as economic 
cities, which have not commenced operations at the time of this writing. These are 
expected to offer benefits similar to those of other countries SEZs, like relaxed 
employment restrictions and full foreign ownership of enterprises (although possibly not 
of land) (Daher 2011). Because these SEZs are not yet operating, Saudi Arabia is 
considered the control group in this study. 
Oman: The four SEZs currently operating in Oman have been established 
pursuant to the Omani Vision 2020 plan, first presented in 1995. The initial zone, Al 
Mazunah, began operation in 1995. All four zones offer 100% foreign ownership, 
reduced hiring requirements, and tax holidays that can be extended indefinitely by 
increasing the share of Omani workers employed (Chekarov). 
United Arab Emirates: The UAE established the first SEZ in the GCC, the Jebel 
Ali Free Zone, in 1985. The free zone offers 100% foreign ownership, a 50-year tax 
exemption, and no import tariffs (Europe Emirates Group). The UAE has since opened as 
many as 45 different SEZs. 
Qatar: In preparation for hosting the 2022 World Cup, Qatar established its first 
system of SEZs, called Manateq (Arabic for ‘areas’) in 2011. Among the benefits to 
investors are 100% foreign ownership, relaxed taxes, and a wide variety of logistical 
support services.   
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4. Methodology 
In order to explore the impact of FDI on labor migration to the Arab Gulf states, 
and consequently whether or not more lenient investment policies contribute to the stated 
goal of workforce indigenization held by each GCC member, this study uses a difference-
in-differences multiple regression model. Migrant stocks serve as the dependent variable, 
while FDI, two dummy variables representing the introduction of policies that allow total 
foreign ownership of domestic enterprises (one representing the counterfactual and the 
other the treatment effect), and a trend variable serve as the independent variables. Data 
for net FDI Inflows (balance of payments, current USD) and total migrant stocks were 
collected from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database. If the 
estimated model returns positive coefficients on the effects of FDI and foreign 
ownership, this would imply that the policies are not having their intended effects, and 
that increased foreign investment causes migration to exceed its trend. Negative 
coefficients would imply a substitution between FDI and immigrant labor, and therefore 
support financial liberalization as a means of developing the domestic workforce and 
discouraging immigration. 
4.1 Target Population  
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This paper focuses on the Gulf Cooperation Council member nations, because of 
their high degree of similarity relative to each other, and their unique character relative to 
the rest of the world. All six members are oil exporting economies, and four, Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, have all been OPEC members 
since the late 1960’s (although Qatar terminated its membership in January, 2019) 
(OPEC). The other two GCC states, Oman and Bahrain, receive between 68-85% and 
85% of their government revenues from petroleum exports respectively (CIA World 
Factbook).  
In addition to petroleum exports dependency, the GCC countries are also all 
heavily reliant upon foreign workers. Saudi Arabia has the smallest concentration of 
foreign migrants in its population at 32% as of 2015, and the UAE had the highest 
concentration at 88% (World Bank). Due to these high levels of immigration and 
coincident with high unemployment rates amongst native populations, all of the members 
have instituted official nationalization programs (as discussed above). This study 
addresses in part the effectiveness of the financial liberalization portion of these 
programs. 
The GCC member states also share a number of general cultural and political 
similarities that will help to control for the effects of institutional variations on people’s 
decisions to migrate to the Gulf. In fact, the GCC charter opens with an explicit 
recognition of the institutional similarities and common goals of the member countries:  
“Being fully aware of the ties of special relations, common characteristics and 
similar systems founded on the creed of Islam which bind them; and Desiring to 
effect coordination, cooperation and integration between them in all fields; and, 
Having the conviction that coordination, cooperation, and integration between 
them serve the sublime objectives of the Arab Nation …” 
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All of the members are Arabic-speaking monarchies that recognize Islam as their official 
state religion, and Sharia as the source of legislation in their constitutions.
5
 In short, for 
economic, social, and political reasons, the GCC members are easy to compare 
statistically regarding the impacts of specific policies. 
4.2 Data 
This study draws its quantitative data from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI) database. This database hosts the most detailed set of immigration and 
investment estimates for the target countries, going back to 1970 and ending in 2015. 
However, even this dataset is incomplete, so the temporal scope of this study is limited 
by data availability. The WDI database has only posted estimates of international migrant 
stocks (IMS) residing in each GCC country every five years starting from 1970. 
Estimates for net FDI inflows (henceforth denoted FDI) are in current USD and presented 
annually, but only extend back to 1970 (1971 for Bahrain). Table 3 gives summary 
statistics for both FDI in millions of dollars, and IMS by country. The regression estimate 
of IMS on FDI and the foreign ownership policy lags FDI one year behind IMS. In this 
case, IMS for 1970 cannot be included, since FDI estimates do not precede 1970. 
Therefore, the analysis begins with FDI1974 and IMS1975, and each country will have nine 
observations, for a total sample size of 54 observations.  
4.3 Foreign Ownership 
                                                          
5
 See their respective constitutions at constitute project.org 
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To specifically account for the effects of liberalizing investment policy, this study 
will define treatment and control groups by introducing a dummy variable representing 
the year that each country first allowed 100% foreign ownership of enterprises operating 
out of its special economic zones. The financial liberalization variable is denoted 
according to the form POST and takes either the value 0 (years prior to allowing full 
foreign ownership in an SEZ) or 1 (years post-policy enactment). In 1985, the UAE 
became the first country to introduce a free trade zone permitting full foreign ownership 
and the remaining GCC states have each introduced similar zones and policies in the 
intervening years (Table 2). 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics by Country 
Country Variable* Mean Std dev Median Min Max 
Bahrain FDI  157 397
 
83.1 -418 1,050 
 IMS 272,311 238,104 189,595 37,946 704,137 
Oman FDI 125 975 102 -2,170 154 
 IMS 536,103 529,464 421,821 62,804 1,844,978 
Qatar FDI 862 1,560 52.2 4.88 4,670 
 IMS 545,605 566,824 334,725 68,339 1,687,640 
UAE FDI 2,790 4,620 56.8 -506 10,900 
 IMS 2,637,468 2,846,466 1,565,346 65,827 8,095,126 
Saudi 
Arabia 
FDI 4,680 9,850 1,180 -3,190 29,200 
IMS 4,710,958 3,168,161 5,060,574 356,996 1.02*10
7
 
Kuwait FDI 189 406 11.8 0.250 1,300 
 IMS 1,252,965 683,214 1,101,016 463,366 2,866,136 
 n 60 60 60 60 60 
*FDI is in millions of USD 
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Table 2: Financial Liberalization Variable POST by Year 
Year Bahrain Oman Qatar UAE 
Saudi 
Arabia Kuwait 
1970 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1975 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1980 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1985 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1990 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1995 0 0 0 1 0 1 
2000 0 1 0 1 1 1 
2005 1 1 0 1 1 1 
2010 1 1 0 1 1 1 
2015 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
Saudi Arabia’s values in POST represent a counterfactual case in which it 
introduced an SEZ with 100% foreign ownership in 2000. Saudi Arabia updated its FDI 
law at that time, but neither included as strong of incentives to investors as the other GCC 
countries have in their respective FDI laws, nor introduced any SEZs. Because Saudi 
Arabia does not permit total foreign ownership and its SEZs have yet to commence 
operations, it will serve as a control for the period of the study. This will be represented 
by a treatment group dummy variable (TREAT), that is valued at 1 for every country 
except for Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia’s values of TREAT are 0 for every year. 
4.4 The Regression Model 
A difference-in-differences model is used to measure the impact of FDI on total 
migrant stocks in each GCC country after the introduction of a policy permitting full 
foreign ownership in special economic zones. Since all countries have at least three 
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observations prior to the adoption such a policy, the model should include sufficient 
observations to compare the policy effects to a counterfactual without its adoption. 
Additionally, the countries are similar enough in their political and economic structures 
to allow for cross-sectional comparison between the countries that needs not account for 
other external factors. The model is given by: 
IMScountry,t = α + αcountry + β1FDIcountry, t-1 + β2POSTcountry,t + δPOST*TREAT+  t + εcountry 
In this equation, α represents the constant error term for the dependent variables, 
and αcountry is the fixed-effect capturing country-specific variation. The term “β1 POST” 
represents the policy effect with respect to the counterfactual observations of Saudi 
Arabia.  POST*TREAT is the interaction term representing the true case in which Saudi 
Arabia serves as the control to determine the differential effect of foreign ownership 
policies on migration.  The final term, “ t”  captures the effect of the trend variable “t,” 
or the passing of time from 1975 to 2015 on IMS. 
The estimated coefficients for net FDI and the interaction variable for foreign 
ownership policy measure the impact of immigration to the GCC. These results offer 
some preliminary insights to the efficacy of liberalization as a component of the council’s 
labor nationalization campaigns. The specific null hypothesis of interest is H0: δ = 0. A 
coefficient less than 0 would imply that the policy effectively discourages immigration to 
the GCC countries. A second null hypothesis, H0: β0 = 0 with β0 less than 0 would imply 
a substitution effect between FDI and IMS.  
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5. Results 
 
5.1 Policy Effects 
First, the regression was estimated without the FDI variable in order to analyze 
the policy impact before controlling for FDI. This regression of IMS on POST, the 
interaction term, and the trend term without controlling for FDI found a significant 
interaction effect in the negative direction (Table 3). It also estimated a highly significant 
trend coefficient (p = .000) implying that another phenomenon likely plays a role in the 
growth of migrant populations. 
To estimate the role of FDI in the policy’s effect, the complete model (given in 
section 4.4) was estimated twice. First with the natural logs of IMS and net FDI to 
estimate the elasticity of IMS to changes in net FDI, and second with the raw number of 
immigrants and net FDI in hundreds of millions of dollars (see Table 4). The log-linear 
model estimation did not find significant results for either the interaction term or FDI, 
and both of those estimated coefficients were positive. The linear model, on the other 
hand, did find an inverse correlation between the policy that was significant at the p = .01 
level. The estimate of the linear model did not, however, find an inverse correlation 
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between IMS and net FDI. Instead, it found a nearly significant (p = .062) direct 
correlation. 
 
 
Table 3: Regression of IMS on Policy 
Variable Coefficient 
(Std Dev) 
Test Statistic* 
(p-value) 
Constant  -1.73*10
8
 
(3.33*10
7
) 
-5.21   
(.000) 
POST 2609722 
 (847551.2) 
3.08 
(.003) 
POST*TREAT -3550286    
(820124.1) 
-4.33 
(.000) 
t 87899.09 
(16777.16) 
5.24 
(.000) 
R
2
 Overall .5094 
 
27.40 
(.000) 
R
2
 Within Country .6171  
R
2
 Between Countries .4830  
n 60 60 
*t statistic for coefficients, and F statistic for R
2 
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Table 4: Regression of IMS on FDI 
 Log-Linear Model Linear Model 
Variable Coefficient 
(Std. Dev.) 
Test Statistic* 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Dev.) 
Test Statistic* 
(p-value) 
Constant -115.7215 
(10.27824) 
-11.26 
(.000) 
-1.82*10
8
 
(3.86*10
7
) 
-4.73 
(.000) 
FDI .1572073 
(.1860937) 
0.84 
(.403) 
6288.459 
(3277.334) 
1.92 
(.062) 
POST -.5185374 
(.2373157) 
-2.19 
(.034) 
1555214 
(862067) 
1.80 
(.078) 
POST*TREAT .3302676 
(.2420184) 
1.36 
(.179) 
 -2589795 
(870319.7) 
-2.98 
(.005) 
t .0630792 
(.0057257) 
11.02 
(.000) 
92373.8 
(19437.08) 
4.75 
(.000) 
R
2
 Overall .2744 
 
 
83.97 
(.000) 
.4916 
 
20.11 
(.000) 
R
2
 Within Country .8842 
 
 .6464   
 
 
R
2
 Between 
Countries 
.7729 
 
 .4689  
 
 
n 54 54 54 54 
*t statistic for coefficients, and F statistic for R
2 
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5.2 Robustness Checks 
To check for endogeneity of FDI in the interaction term, a nearly identical model 
is estimated with net FDI taking the place of the independent variable and IMS as a 
dependent variable. This estimation employs all 60 observations. Since IMS lags FDI by 
one year and net FDI values are available for all countries from 1971 to 2016, all IMS 
observation can be included from 1970 to 2015. The estimation of both log-linear and 
linear variants of this model found significant inverse correlations between net FDI and 
the interaction term. These results indicate both that FDI is endogenous to the policy and 
that the introduction of the policy corresponds with lower net FDI than might otherwise 
be expected. 
A final robustness check replaced net FDI with the Penn World Table’s estimates 
of total capital stocks (in ppp 2011 USD) in the estimated log-linear model. This 
estimation found no correlation between the interaction term and IMS, although this 
might be explained by the endogeneity of capital to the policy (Table 6). It did, however, 
find a positive correlation between capital and labor. This result agrees with the estimates 
in Table 4, but again contradicts macroeconomic theory predicting an inverse 
relationship. 
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Table 5: Regression of FDI on IMS  
 Log-Linear Model Linear Model 
Variable Coefficient 
(Std Dev) 
Test Statistic* 
(p-value) 
Coefficient 
(Std Dev) 
Test 
Statistic* 
(p-value) 
Constant 14.42603 
(9.950548) 
1.45 
(.153) 
-511.7651 
(1012.878) 
-0.51 
(.616) 
IMS .0372178 
(.064804) 
0.57 
(.568) 
7.21*10
-6
 
(3.44*10
-6
) 
2.09 
(.041) 
POST .416551 
(.1414319) 
2.95 
(.005) 
-53.69353 
(23.59107) 
-2.28 
(.027) 
TREAT*POST -.4498511 
(.1344739) 
-3.35 
(.002) 
-53.69353 
(23.59107) 
-2.28 
(.027) 
t .0041165 
(.005376) 
0.77 
(.447) 
.2573609 
(.5118475) 
0.50 
(.617) 
R
2
 Overall .4530 
 
8.37 
(.000) 
.5268 
 
9.98 
(.000) 
R
2
 Within Country .4012 
 
 .4440 
 
 
R
2
 Between Countries .7022 
 
 .8921 
 
 
n 60 60 60 60 
*t statistic for coefficients, and F statistic for R
2 
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Table 6: Regression of Capital Stocks on IMS 
Variable Coefficient 
(St. Deviation) 
Test Statistic* 
(p-value) 
Constant -80.41157 
(14.02125) 
 -5.73 
(.000) 
Capital Stocks .3128608 
(.0923383) 
3.39 
(.001) 
POST -.3183128 
(.2141271) 
-1.49 
(.144) 
TEAT*POST -.0002619 
(.2158155) 
-0.00 
(.999) 
t .0453141 
(.0074727) 
6.06 
(.000) 
R
2
 Overall .7761 
 
106.83 
(.000) 
R
2
 Within Country .9066  
R
2
 Between Countries .9646  
n 54 54 
*t statistic for coefficients, and F statistic for R
2 
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6. Conclusion 
Overall, this study produced several contradictory results, but generally indicates 
that SEZs and liberal investment policies have either contributed to or coincided with a 
negative deviation from the immigration trend. The proposed mechanism, a substitution 
effect between migrant labor and invest, however, cannot explain the effect of these 
policies. These findings open many possibilities for further research. 
6.1 Empirical Results 
The preliminary regression, without net FDI, strongly implied that SEZs with full 
foreign ownership contributed to reduced immigration. The results of the complete 
model, on the other hand, found an insignificant but positive effect in the log-linear 
model and a significant negative effect in the linear model. Since the log-linear model 
fails to corroborate the implication of the linear model, the finding that financial 
liberalization decreases the trend in migration is not very robust. 
The endogeneity test found a significant inverse correlation between FDI and the 
SEZ policy. This might help to explain why other tests indicate a direct relationship 
between IMS and investment, but it also implies that the policy does not actually attract 
FDI. Since the FDI values used in this are net, it could also indicate that the policy or 
another contemporaneous policy encourages more investment abroad than it attracts. 
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The most surprising result of this study is the estimated complementary effect 
between investment and migration. Whether investment is measured by net FDI or total 
capital stocks, the estimated models always return positive coefficients for the investment 
term. Of course, since the trend coefficient is small but significant in the IMS on FDI 
estimations, the FDI coefficient may reflect an unobserved confounding variable that 
more properly belongs to the trend effect. 
6.2 Implications for Further Research 
This study attempted to justify the parallel trends assumption necessary for a 
difference-in-differences analysis with a qualitative comparison of GCC economies and 
governing institutions. Future research might justify this with a more rigorous analysis of 
trends prior to the policies introduction. Unfortunately, any study of the Gulf economies 
is limited by the availability of data, and it may be difficult to find significant results with 
few observations. 
Additionally, the unexpected complementarity of immigration and invest in the 
GCC case require further research. First, a separate study on their relationship should be 
conducted to confirm my findings. Such a study would ideally distinguish between 
skilled and unskilled workers, since the lack of this distinction may have confounded my 
results. Then, should their complementarity be replicated for unskilled workers, this 
would need a new theoretical justification. Otherwise, a study with more controls for 
relevant macro variables like oil prices or natural resource rents may find the predicted 
substitution effect. 
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Of course, GCC policy does not only affect the GCC member, and the effects of 
policy discouraging immigration on the sending countries is also warranted. Since these 
countries have a vested interest in receiving remittances, their policies may encourage 
emigration and their responses to GCC policy may be confounding the estimated 
correlation between IMS and FDI. 
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